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Abstract: Between 1987 and 1989, Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough 
Council entered into nearly 600 derivatives transactions. In 1991, the House of Lords 
held that it lacked the capacity to do so and the contracts were therefore void. Taking 
this landmark litigation as its starting point, this article seeks to explain the persistence 
and evolution of the problem of ultra vires, as it has affected local authorities 
participating in the derivatives markets. Specifically, the article traces how the 
derivatives markets have transformed beyond recognition in terms of their size, 
complexity and global reach over the three decades since the Hammersmith litigation, 
and it explores the resulting changes in the ultra vires disputes which come before the 
English courts. The article goes on to examine in detail the recent ‘second wave’ of 
ultra vires decisions, involving public bodies from Norway, Holland and Italy, 
amongst others. The analysis demonstrates how the global nature of the contemporary 
financial markets has further complicated the ultra vires problem, generating novel 
and difficult questions for the English courts. The article concludes that this area of 
law now contains a significant contradiction, between the English courts’ market-
minded approach on the one hand, and the harshness of the traditional doctrine of ultra 
vires on the other. 





Today’s global derivatives market is unrecognisable compared to that of thirty years ago, 
when Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council entered into its 592 ill-fated 
swaps. In the 1980s, this market was so new that the Divisional Court, in the course of the 
subsequent litigation involving the council, provided a glossary of terms at the end of its 
judgment. By 2017, the notional value of the market was $542 trillion,
1
 while a single 
derivatives clearing house in London cleared contracts worth a record $873 trillion notional 
value in the same year.
2
 
This dramatic transformation has been driven by a combination of globalisation and 
contractual standardisation. The latter is largely a result of the success of the Master 
Agreement published by the trade association, the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA). One reason for the dominance of this contractual framework is that it 
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1
 Bank for International Settlements, ‘Global OTC derivatives markets: semi-annual statistics for notional 
amounts outstanding, H1 2017’ (2 November 2017) <https://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm> all websites 
last accessed 25 February 2018. 
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facilitates cross-border trading. More specifically, its ‘orderly contractual structure’
3
 is 
supported by legal opinions for use in over sixty jurisdictions, ranging from Anguilla to the 
USA,
4
 and bolstered by safe harbour legislation in major jurisdictions worldwide.
5
 The 
overall effect is to neutralise or mitigate a range of potential risks to the legal framework 
supporting this international market.
6
 
One risk, however, has defied a neat solution during this transformative period. This 
is the problem of ultra vires, as it has affected local authorities participating in the derivatives 
market. The problem first arose in this jurisdiction in litigation concerning the swaps entered 
into by Hammersmith and Fulham council in the late 1980s, and it continues to generate 
significant litigation today. As well as longevity, the problem is characterised by its gravity 
and complexity. It consistently raises difficult and novel legal questions, while the fact that a 
lack of capacity is ‘inextricably linked with nullity’
7
 in English law means that the stakes are 
invariably high.  
This article explores the concurrent evolution of the derivatives market and of the law 
around the capacity of local authorities to participate in them. The argument is developed in 
four parts. The first part of the article considers the English doctrine of ultra vires, focusing 
on its application to statutory bodies including local authorities, the problems long-associated 
with ultra vires and the piecemeal legislative response. The second part analyses the 
landmark litigation involving Hammersmith and Fulham council and it explains the enduring 
significance of the decision. The following part of the article identifies a ‘second wave’ of 
local authority ultra vires decisions which has subsequently occurred in the English courts, 
explaining the relationship between the quantity and qualities of these cases and the evolution 
of the underlying market. The fourth part of the article explores the themes which emerge 
from this set of cases. It demonstrates that while the legal reasoning behind recent decisions 
is expressly ‘internationalist’ and market-minded, the applicable legal framework means that 
the traditional English ultra vires doctrine may still apply to produce harsh, and sometimes 
unexpected, results. 
It is important to note upfront that this ultra vires problem has triggered litigation in 
civil and criminal courts around the world and has also led to claims before international 
arbitral tribunals.
8
 Whilst engaging with the international dimension to recent ultra vires 
disputes, this article focuses on the English courts (and principally, but not always, on 
English law). In part, this focus is required for reasons of space, but it also reflects the 
international role that the English courts fulfil in the derivatives market. While the English 
courts have long been a forum of choice in global commerce (in 2016, 45% of cases in the 
English Admiralty and Commercial Courts involved no parties from the jurisdiction and 70% 
involved at least one international party),
9
 they play a particularly important function in the 
global derivatives market. This influence reaches far beyond the jurisdiction, and, as 
explained below, is thanks principally to choices made under the widely-used ISDA terms.  
 
                                                     
3
 Banco Santander Totta v Cia Carris de Ferro de Lisboa [2016] EWHC 465 (Comm), [2016] 4 WLR 49 [400] 
(Blair J).   
4
 ISDA, Opinions Overview < https://www.isda.org/opinions-overview/ > 
5
 For example, Directive 2002/ 47/ EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on 
financial collateral arrangements.  
6
 As discussed in Joanna Benjamin, Financial Law (OUP 2007) Chapter 14 (‘The Rise of Net Positions) and as 
demonstrated in practice by the study conducted by Annelise Riles, Collateral Knowledge (University of 
Chicago Press 2011).  
7
 Haugesund Kommune v Depfa ACS Bank [2010] EWCA Civ 579, [2012] QB 549 [135] (Etherton LJ).  
8
 Standard Chartered Bank v Ceylon Petroleum Corporation [2011] EWHC 1785 (Comm) 
9
 TheCityUK (sic), ‘Legal Excellence, Internationally Renowned: UK legal services 2017’ (November 2017) 4.  




Ultra Vires and Local Authorities 
 
The capacity of statutory bodies  
 
The capacity to enter into a contract means different things in the context of natural persons 
and statutory bodies. The rules around the capacity of natural persons flow from the 
overarching principle of freedom of contract. Accordingly, a person of full capacity is able to 
make the contracts they like subject only to piecemeal regulation, for example in cases of 
undue influence, illegality or fraud. The starting point for a statutory body, such as a 
company, a building society or a local authority (including a borough council) is different. 
Statutory bodies may only act within the capacity that they have been given. As Lord 
Templeman put it in Hazell v Hammersmith & Fulham London Borough Council, a local 
authority ‘is not a sovereign body and can only do such things as are expressly or impliedly 
authorised by Parliament.’
10
 Any actions beyond those powers will be ultra vires. Contracts 
entered into ultra vires will be a nullity, or wholly void in law.
11
 Credit Suisse v Allerdale 
Borough Council
12
 confirmed that a contract cannot be partly ultra vires, nor were there 
‘categories of invalidity’.
13
 To the well-known English maxim of ‘fraud unravels all’;
14
 we 
might add ‘unless ultra vires gets there first’. 
The purpose of the doctrine of ultra vires is two-fold. In Cotman v Brougham
15
 Lord 
Parker stated that the objectives in the context of a company were first, to afford ‘protection 
to subscribers’, who accordingly know what the company will do with their investment; and 
secondly, the ‘protection of persons who deal with the company’, who may see from the 
company’s ‘objects in its memorandum’ what sorts of transactions a company is permitted to 
enter into. In the context of a local authority such as Hammersmith and Fulham LBC, the 
question of the lawfulness or otherwise of the council’s swaps transactions, as the Court of 




Problems with the ultra vires doctrine 
 
The statements above suggest a bright line between lawfulness and unlawfulness; use and 
misuse. Practice, however, is more complicated. There is a long history of cases considering 
the capacity of statutory bodies and who should bear the losses when it is missing. These 
cases have been accompanied by a long-running academic commentary, particularly in the 
corporate context.
17
 Two main criticisms of the doctrine run throughout this debate.  
                                                     
10
 Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council [1992] 2 AC 1 (HL), 22B (Hazell HL). 
11
 As explored below, the exact consequences of the nullity for the different parties involved will depend on the 
facts of the case ibid 36E. In the context of a company, the classic statement of the position is found in Rolled 
Steel Products (Holdings) Ltd v British Steel Corpn [1986] Ch 246 (CA), 304-305 (Browne-Wilkinson LJ).  
12
 [1997] QB 306.  
13
 ibid 343 (Neill LJ). 
14
 A common translation of ex turpi causa non oritur actio, eg, United City Merchants (Investment) Ltd v 
Vitrorefuerzos SA [1983] 1 AC 168 (HL), 184 (Lord Diplock). 
15
 [1918] AC 514 (HL), 520. 
16
 Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council [1990] 2 QB 697 (CA), 776 (Sir Stephen 
Brown P) (Hazell CA). 
17
 Going back to, eg, KW Wedderburn, ‘What is the point of ultra vires?’ (1966) 29 Modern Law Review 191; 
R Baxt, ‘Is the doctrine of ultra vires dead?’ (1971) 20 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 301; KW 
Wedderburn ‘Ultra vires in modern company law’ (1983) 46 Modern Law Review 204.  
 4 
First, in English law it is irrelevant if a third party contracting with a body acting ultra 
vires lacks notice of the fact, while ultra vires acts may not be ratified later.
18
 As a result, 
losses are often borne by third parties acting in good faith. In Allerdale BC the Court of 
Appeal highlighted the resulting vulnerability of parties which contract ‘in ignorance of any 
procedural defect which may later entitle the public body to claim that the contract was made 
ultra vires and so reject liability under it.’
19
 Indeed, an article cited in this case was entitled 
‘Do banks dare to lend to local authorities?’.
20
 In Allerdale BC, the bank’s guarantee from the 
council was ultimately held to be void, and its losses ran to nearly £6 million. Peter Gibson 
LJ described the council’s use of its own unlawful act to avoid payment as a particularly 
‘unattractive feature’ of the case
21
 while in the same case Neill LJ stated that he did not 
regard ‘the present law to be satisfactory.’
22
 Nonetheless, nullity and the impossibility of 
ratification persist as the ‘two badges of a transaction which is ultra vires’.
23
 
The second problem relates to the unpredictability of determinations about particular 
transactions, which is compounded by the fact that ultra vires disputes tend to arise in the 
context of innovative business practices never envisaged at the time that the operative statute 
was drafted. As Martin Loughlin has put it, judges may be faced by a choice between two 
‘plausible interpretations of the powers [of the entity in question]’ so, in the end, much will 
turn on the judiciary’s characterisation of the transaction in question, and the local authority’s 
relationship to it.
24
 Similarly, in the corporate context, Paul Davies and Jonathan Rickford 
observed that the doctrine of ultra vires leads to ‘highly technical and unpredictable results’.
25
 
The 1875 decision of the House of Lords in Ashbury Railway Carriage & Iron Co v Riches
26
  
shows how difficult this type of choice can be in practice. Reversing the lower courts’ 
decision, the Lord Chancellor Lord Cairns noted the case’s messy history, involving a 3:3 
split between the six judges of the appellate Exchequer Chamber and seven years of litigation 
in total, which he stated was ‘not, I must say, creditable to our legal proceedings’.
27
 Very 
similar charges, as we shall see, were levelled at the courts in the bitter aftermath of the 
Hammersmith and Fulham LBC litigation.  
 
‘Solving’ the ultra vires problem  
 
In theory, a ‘solution’ to disputes about ultra vires actions by statutory bodies is simple, 
assuming a suitably-inclined legislature. In practice in the UK, mounting criticisms of the 
ultra vires doctrine have resulted in incremental legislative reforms affecting numerous types 
of statutory body.   
Most importantly for this purpose, under the Localism Act 2011 (the ‘2011 Act’), 
which came into force on 18 February 2012, local authorities in England are now allowed to 
do ‘anything that individuals generally may do’.
28
 This ‘general power of competence’ was 
portrayed by the Coalition Government behind the 2011 Act as an initiative to ‘pass power 
                                                     
18
 Ashbury Railway Carriage & Iron Co v Riche (1874-5) LR 7 HL 653 (HL). 
19
 Allerdale BC (n 12) 344 (Neill LJ). 
20
 Peter Cane, ‘Do Banks Dare to Lend to Local Authorities?’ (1994) 110 LQR 514. 
21




 Rolled Steel Products (n 11) 305 (Browne-Wilkinson LJ). 
24
 Martin Loughlin, ‘Innovative Financing in local government: The limits of legal instrumentalism Part 2’ 
[1991] Public Law 569, 595. 
25
 Paul Davies and Jonathan Rickford, ‘An introduction to the new UK Companies Act’ (2008) 1 ECFR 48, 57. 
26
 Ashbury Railway (n 18). 
27
 ibid 663.  
28
 Localism Act 2011, s 1(1).  
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back to where it belonged’
29
 and as having turned ‘upside down’ traditional assumptions 
about the capacity of statutory bodies.
30
 Significantly, unlike its predecessor, the ‘well-being’ 
power introduced by section 2(1) of the Local Government Act 2000, there is no obligation 
upon local authorities to identify a specific benefit when exercising the new general power of 
competence.
31
 Other, more specific reforms relating to local authorities’ capacity to enter into 
contracts were implemented by the Local Government (Contracts) Act 1997. Section 2 
permits a local authority to certify that a contract is intra vires, subject to meeting certain 
conditions (set out in section 3, including identifying the statutory power under which the 
contract is made). The result of a properly made certification is that the contract in question 
takes effect as an intra vires one and this has been described as providing an ‘important 
exception’ to the ultra vires doctrine.
32
  
The Explanatory Note to the 2011 Act states that the general power of competence 
‘may be used in innovative ways … unlike anything that a local authority–or other public 
body–has done before, or may currently do.’
33
 The practical effect of the new power, 
however, remains up for debate. In one example of new activities facilitated by this reform, a 
2016 House of Commons Briefing Paper reported that it has enabled local authorities to set 
up companies to trade for commercial purposes more freely than they did in the past.
34
 
However, there remain important express limits on what a local authority can do, including 
that the general power will not enable a local authority to override any ‘pre-commencement 
limitation’ to its activities.
35
 This term is defined as ‘a prohibition, restriction or other 
limitation expressly imposed by a statutory provision’
36
 found either in the 2011 Act, passed 
before the end of the parliamentary session in which the 2011 Act was passed, or contained in 
an instrument made under another Act which came into force before the commencement of 
the 2011 Act. The various limits to the general power of competence found in the 2011 Act 
and in the common law
37
 are such that they leave the door open to uncertainty and even 
litigation, not least because, as a leading QC observed, ‘the rationale for the Bill was largely 
left unexplained before its introduction…’.
38
 The 2011 Act therefore represents an important 
change for local authorities both ideologically and in practice, but the general power of 
competence is neither untrammelled nor uncomplicated.  
A more radical and clear-cut example of new legislation ousting the traditional 
doctrine of ultra vires
39
 is found in the Companies Act 2006 which provides that, subject to 
any express limits in the articles of association, the objects of a company are unrestricted.
40
 
Section 39(1) further provides that an act of a company may not be challenged on the ground 
                                                     
29
 Department for Communities and Local Government, ‘A plain English guide to the Localism Act’ (15 
November 2011) 1.  
30
 ibid 4.  
31
 Discussed in Ashley Bowes and John Stanton, ‘The Localism Act 2011 and the general power of competence’ 
[2014] Public Law 392, 392-394. 
32
 Hugh Beale (ed), Chitty on Contracts (32nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) [11-021]. 
33
 2011 Act, Explanatory Note [10]. 
34
 Mark Sandford, The General Power of Competence (House of Commons Library Briefing Paper Number 
05687, 2016) [3.4]. 
35
 2011 Act, s 2(2)(a). 
36
 ibid s 2(4).  
37
 The question of whether the general power is subject to judicial review is discussed in Bowes and Stanton (n 
31) 397-400. 
38
 Helen Mountfield QC, ‘The ‘General Power of Competence’ in the Localism Act 2011: Devolving 
Democracy or the End of Accountability?’ (14 October 2012) Public Law Project Conference, 2. 
39
 For discussion of the position of different statutory bodies, including Limited Liability Partnerships, see GH 
Treitel, The Law of Contract  (Edwin Peel ed, 14th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) [12-066]–[12-070].  
40
 Companies Act 2006, s 31(1).  
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of lack of capacity by reason of anything in the company’s constitution. In effect, the regime 
implemented by the 2006 Act extinguishes the doctrine of ultra vires in this context.
41
 
Overall, therefore, recent legislative reforms have diminished the significance of the 
doctrine of ultra vires for the most important types of UK statutory bodies. The position for 
local authorities is less clear-cut than that for companies, but the 2011 Act has fundamentally 
shifted the central presumption in this area of law. Nonetheless, as the remainder of the 
article will show, the traditional and unchecked version of the English doctrine of ultra vires, 
seen in full force in the Hammersmith litigation, remains as relevant as ever in the modern 
derivatives market.  
 
 
Hazell v Hammersmith & Fulham LBC 
 
The landmark case of Hazell 
 
Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC is one of the most significant cases in English law, 
and it remains controversial thirty years after the events behind the litigation.  
Some background is necessary in order to explain how this dispute came to have such 
lasting significance. In the 1980s local authorities in the UK were spending more and 
receiving less, partially as a result of this period’s ‘botched experiments’ in monetary policy 
which had seen prices and unemployment soar,
42
 and partly because of declining levels of 
central government grants.
43
 Other sources of local authority income, including rates and 
rents, were falling and borrowing was on the rise. Local authorities at the time borrowed from 
both the Public Works Loan Commissioners and the money markets, at variable and fixed 
rates of interest,
44
 and this was in a period when variable meant variable.
45
 Interest rate swaps 
were one of several novel arrangements that local authorities started to enter into in this 
period to avoid central government’s expenditure cuts, sidestep penalties, maximise grants 
and bolster revenue.
46
 As Lord Templeman observed  
 
 The evidence discloses that about 1981 there appeared in the world of international 





In December 1983 Hammersmith and Fulham LBC (‘Hammersmith’) entered into its first 
derivative transaction; other local authorities were entering into the markets at the same time. 
Initially, two or three such swaps a year were carried out by Hammersmith, the number rising 
modestly in 1986-87 to seventeen, with a total notional principal of £112m. Hammersmith’s 
                                                     
41
 For a discussion of this part of the 2006 Act, see David Kershaw, Company Law in Context (OUP 2009) 108. 
42
 Mark Carney, ‘Opening remarks to the Bank of England ‘Independence–20 years on’ Conference’ 28 
September 2017 <www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches>    
In this speech, Carney notes that prices rose by 750% in the twenty five years to 1992, more than over the 250 
years before that.  
43
 As described in Martin Loughlin, ‘Innovative financing in local government: the limits of legal 
instrumentalism. Part 1’ [1990] Public Law 372 
44
 Hazell HL (n 10) 32. 
45
 Bank of England base rate was changed twelve times in 1975 alone, fluctuating from a high of 12% in 
October to a low of 9.75% in April (compare the current rate, which was 0.5% from March 2009 to August 
2016). The Bank of England, ‘Statistical Interactive Database: Official Bank Rate history’  
<https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/iadb/Repo.asp > 
46
 Loughlin (n 43) 377. 
47
 Hazell HL (n 10) 23. 
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activity was at this point in keeping with comparable London councils. While its 1983-1987 
swap contracts were not challenged in the litigation, the court assumed that they were being 
used as ‘parallel contracts’ to manage the interest rate risk in an underlying debt.
48
 This 
means, as expressed in the Court of Appeal decision, that they were being used to meet the 
‘legitimate concerns’ with regards to a specific underlying obligation.
49
  
In 1987, unbeknownst to the council’s leadership,
50
 Hammersmith’s finance 
department’s strategy changed radically.
51
 Appendix B to the Divisional Court decision 
demonstrates how spectacularly Hammersmith increased its dealings in the two financial 
years 1987-89, which were the subject of the subsequent litigation. In this period, the council 
entered into 592 transactions involving a principal notional sum of £6 billion. By comparison, 
the council’s expenditure for 1988-89 in discharging all of its other functions amounted to 
£85.7m.
52
 While there were no ‘reliable statistics’ about local authorities’ swap activities or 
Hammersmith’s exact market share,
53
 it was estimated that at this time, Hammersmith 
accounted for 0.5% of the entire global market in derivatives
54
 and about 10% of the interest 
rate swap market in the UK.
55
 As Duncan Campbell-Smith put it, ‘[e]ven more astonishing 
than Hammersmith’s dilatory handling of the crisis was the sheer financial scale of it’.
56
 
In June 1988, the regulatory body for local authority auditors, the Audit Commission, 
was tipped off about Hammersmith’s portfolio. It sent auditor Tony Hazell of Deloitte, 
Haskins & Sells to investigate, and later sought a legal opinion from two barristers on the 
lawfulness of the swaps.
57
 Meanwhile, from July 1988 the council began to pursue what 
became known as an ‘interim strategy’ with the intention of managing the risk of the 
council’s open positions, but the crisis continued to mount. Once the Government refused to 
sanction further trades by the council or indemnify councilors and officers involved,
58
 the 
council ceased all activity in the derivatives market and litigation followed in short order. 
This litigation was not a ‘David and Goliath’ fight between the local authority and its 
banks. Rather, the case was brought by the council’s auditor for a declaration from the court 
under section 19(1) of the Local Government Finance Act 1982 that the swaps transactions 
entered into by Hammersmith in the financial years 1987-88 and 1988-89 were entered into 
without authority and were therefore unlawful, and that the council’s accounts be rectified 
accordingly. In fact, the banks had to seek permission to become involved in the case, and 
over thirty ‘aggrieved banks’
59
 formed an action group to co-ordinate litigation and split the 
legal fees. Five banks representing a cross-section of transactions were subsequently given 
                                                     
48
 Hazell CA (n 16) 766 (Sir Stephen Brown P). 
49
 ibid 765 and 780-781 (Sir Stephen Brown P). 
50
 Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council [1990] 2 WLR 18 (QBD), 26 (Hazell DC). 
51
 While a portion of the 1987-89 transactions were interest rate swaps, the majority were more complicated 
varieties of interest rate derivatives as defined in Hazell DC (n 50) Appendix A.   
52
 ibid 24 and Appendix B.  
53
 V.V. Veeder QC, John Barratt and Michael Reddington, ‘The Final Report of the Independent Inquiry into 
Capital Market Activities of the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham’ (July 1991) (Veeder Report) 6-
17 and 6-18.  
54
 Duncan Campbell-Smith, Follow the Money: The Audit Commission, Public Money and the Management of 
Public Services, 1983-2008 (Allen Lane 2008) 192. 
55
 Veeder Report (n 53) [6-18]. 
56
 Campbell-Smith (n 54) 192.  
57
 The two barristers returned three legal opinions. A joint opinion stated that derivatives were generally ultra 
vires counsel. The QC opined separately that ‘parallel contracts’ were lawful, and junior counsel provided 
another opinion stating that all derivatives were unlawful. ibid 190. 
58
 ibid 195.  
59
 Patrick Stewart and Richard Phillips, ‘The Deals of 1991’ (January 1992) 11(1) International Financial Law 
Review 14.  
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permission by the court to join the litigation as respondents.
60
 Otherwise, the banks feared, 
‘nobody would have argued the market’.
61
  
This case was not, therefore, started by councils in order to avoid their contracts 
(indeed some were doing quite well from them) but it nonetheless affected an estimated 77 
local authorities across the UK which, between them, had reportedly entered into 400 swap 
transactions with 76 banks and financial institutions, representing around one third of all 
sterling-based swaps.
62
 As such, Hazell was self-evidently a test case, albeit an unusual one 
involving an outlier council and a coordinated group of banks which was providing the 
adversarial element at its own request. 
 
The powers of the local authority 
 
As already noted, statutory bodies only have the capacity they are given. There was no 
express statutory power authorising the council to enter into the swap transactions in the 
Local Government Act 1972,
63
 or indeed forbidding them from doing so.
64
 As the Court of 
Appeal observed, this lack of coverage was not surprising given that the swaps market had 
emerged after the relevant statute came into force.
65
 Furthermore, all the parties to the 
litigation accepted that local authorities had no powers (express or implied) to engage in a 
trade or business for profit.
66
 This meant that local authorities had no powers to enter to into 
swaps with a view to ploughing profits back into legitimate functions.  
Accordingly, the council’s powers  to carry on swaps depended on the interpretation 
of section 111(1) of the Local Government Act 1972 (the Act), the relevant part of which 
stated 
 
(1)  Without prejudice to any powers exercisable apart from this section but 
subject to the provisions of this Act … a local authority shall have power to do 
any thing (whether or not involving the expenditure, borrowing or lending of 
money or the acquisition or disposal of any property or rights) which is 
calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or incidental to, the discharge of 




The House of Lords and both lower courts all accepted that the ‘functions’ of a local 
authority referenced in section 111(1), which had no express definition in statute, meant those 
activities that Parliament authorised it to undertake elsewhere in the Act.
68
 This included the 
power to borrow, which was governed by section 172 of the Act and the ‘extremely detailed 
provisions’
69
 of Part I of Schedule 13. Hammersmith’s borrowings amounted to £390m as at 
31 March 1989, and were subject to a mixture of fixed and variable rates. The pivotal 
                                                     
60
 Midland Bank, Security Pacific National Bank, Chemical Bank and Mitsubishi Finance International Ltd and 
Barclays Bank. The last of these was separately represented and made slightly different submissions, for eg, 
Hazell CA (n 16) 770.  
61
 Irene Dorner, the head of legal services at Midland Montagu Bank, quoted in Stewart and Philips (n 59) 15. 
62
 Hazell CA (n 16) 764. Veeder Report (n 53) [6-17], noting that there were no reliable statistics for local 
authority involvement in swaps, but citing a variety of sources for the estimates reproduced above.  
63
 Hazell DC (n 50) 35.  
64






 This author’s emphasis.  
68
 Hazell HL (n 10) 29 (Lord Templeman) and ibid 45 (Lord Ackner). All the Hazell decisions were in 
agreement on this point: Hazell CA (n 16) 785 and Hazell DC (n 50) 36.  
69
 Hazell HL (n 10) 45C (Lord Ackner). 
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question was therefore whether swap transactions could be said either to ‘facilitate’, or to be 
‘conducive or incidental to’ the function of borrowing.  
 
Divisional Court and Court of Appeal 
 
The Divisional Court handed down judgment on 1 November 1989. It held that a local 
authority had no authority to enter into swaps, and that consequently, all of Hammersmith’s 
592 transactions were void. While borrowing and investing were functions of the local 
authority, swap transactions were not incidental to those functions for the purpose of section 
111(1). They were only capable of being ‘incidental to the incidental’ function of paying 
interest. In addition, the Court observed that there had been no proper delegation of the 
council’s powers to its officers, and that the council’s capital market fund was not validly 
established.   
In February 1990, the Court of Appeal overruled the Divisional Court, holding that 
swaps entered into by the council for risk management purposes were capable of being 
lawful. The decision emphasized the need to look at the ‘type of purpose’ not the ‘type of 
transaction’ in order to determine the validity of a swap.
70
 Specifically, the Court of Appeal 
held that it was lawful for the council to enter swaps with the purpose of ‘interest rate risk 
management’, which was held to be ‘incidental to or consequential upon a local authority’s 
powers of borrowing and investment’.
71
 The distinguishing feature of a swap which served 
this purpose was that it had a ‘clear linkage’ to a particular debt or investment, ie, ‘parallel 
contracts’ were lawful.
72
 By contrast, a swap entered into for ‘trading’ purposes including 
where the council intermediated a deal for another party in return for a profit,
73
 would not be 
lawful.  
The Court of Appeal concluded that, when serving this risk management function, 
swaps merely provided a ‘newly-fashioned tool which achieves, more economically and 
expeditiously, substantially the same commercial result as could lawfully be achieved in the 
discharge of the duty by more traditional means.’
74
 If a council had borrowed under a fixed 
rate loan when interest rates started to fall, one lawful option was to take out a new loan to 
pay off the fixed rate debt, but this was likely to incur an early repayment fee. The Court of 
Appeal recognised that interest rate swaps could achieve the same, beneficial outcome more 
cheaply and more easily.  
However, it became apparent within the Court of Appeal’s own judgment that even a 
narrow and simplified definition of ‘investment rate risk management’ was problematic when 
applied to a real-world deals. The problem was that the court either must try to determine a 
party’s intention relating to blocks of activity over a particular timespan, or undertake a ‘deal 
by deal’ analysis in order to adjudicate the purpose of every one of the hundreds of disputed 
transactions. Following the broader approach of looking at blocks of deals, the Court of 
Appeal held that the councils’ transactions up to July 1988 were all ‘tainted with the 
improper purpose of trading’ for the ‘one clinching fact’ that there was no evidence that the 
council had attempted to analyse the interest it was exposed to or evaluate how to mitigate its 
risks.
75
 By contrast, from July 1988 to February 1989, during the interim strategy, the Court 
held that all swaps were undertaken for a ‘radically different’ purpose:
76
 these later swaps 
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were lawful because the purpose was to mitigate losses which the public might be exposed to 
because of earlier trades.  
 
Hazell in the House of Lords 
 
In January 1991, the House of Lords upheld the auditor and council’s appeal from the Court 
of Appeal, rejecting the banks’ arguments in their entirety.
77
 The House of Lords diverged 
sharply with the Court of Appeal’s legal analysis and with its characterisation of the new 
derivative markets.  
The overriding theme of their Lordships’ analysis was that all swaps posed 
‘substantial risks’ and were ‘essentially speculative’
78
 even when performing the narrow 
hedging function described by the Court of Appeal. Moreover, the House of Lords held, if 
Parliament had intended local authorities to have access to such products, it would have 
expressly provided for it within the ‘detailed code’
79
 governing local authorities’ powers, as it 
had done in the case of building societies.
80
 These themes are evident through four main 
elements of the House of Lords’ interpretation of section 111(1).  
First, the House of Lords held that swaps could not ‘facilitate’ the function of 
borrowing because a local authority which was encouraged to borrow on the assumption that 
it could rely on a successful swap in the future would be ‘failing in its duty to act prudently in 
the interests of the ratepayers’.
81
 Similarly, swaps were not ‘conducive to’ borrowing because 
local authorities should not be relying on them and should not see them as encouragement to 
borrow.
82
 As Lord Ackner put it in his concurring opinion, swaps merely offered the ‘hope of 
gain’ and left the underlying debt ‘wholly unmanaged’.
83
 
Secondly, swaps were held not to be ‘incidental’ to borrowing. This was because 
swaps were a separate contract to any underlying debt, and could be entered into at a totally 
different time.
84
 The authorities were held to show that being ‘incidental’ meant that an 
action was a ‘potential necessity’,
85
 and not just ‘convenient or desirable or profitable’.
86
 
Moreover, the question had to be decided not as a general matter but in light of the particular 
regime provided by Parliament in the borrowing provisions in Schedule 13 of the 1972 Act. 
Lord Templeman found this to be a ‘comprehensive code’
87
 which already allowed a local 
authority considerable scope to tailor its borrowing to suit its needs and address market 
volatility. Such a detailed scheme was not consistent with the existence of an incidental 
power to enter into swap transactions. The example was provided of unfavourable loan, 
which could be managed under Schedule 13 by repaying it or by renegotiating with the lender 
to replace one rate with another. The fact that this may be more expensive a route than 
entering a swap to manage the situation ‘cannot render swap transactions legal.’
88
 Parliament 
                                                     
77
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had simply not provided for local authorities to have access to swaps in addition to the 
detailed borrowing options set out in Schedule 13.   
Thirdly, swaps could not be ‘incidental’ to a different function of debt management 
(as was held by the Court of Appeal). The House of Lords rejected the notion that debt 
management was a function of a local authority, finding that it was ‘a phrase which has been 
coined in this case to describe the activities of a person who enters the swap market for the 




Fourthly, the House of Lords also rejected the banks’ arguments that swap 
transactions were comparable to insurance and part of the prudent management of the 
council’s business. Given the possibility of a party being ‘out of the money’, they were held 
to be ‘more akin to gambling than insurance’.
90
  
Swaps entered into as part of the interim strategy were not spared. They were held to 
‘suffer from the same stigma of being unlawful’
91
 on the basis that the council had no power 
to enter into swap transactions regardless of whether they were part of the interim strategy or 
not.
92
 Moreover, an ultra vires transaction could not provide the basis for an intra vires 
transaction.
93
 There was no lawful underlying function for the latter.
94
  
Accordingly, the House of Lords found for the auditor. It restored the Divisional 
Court’s order under section 19(1) of the Local Government Finance Act 1982 that the swaps 
transactions were unlawful and that the accounts for the financial years 1987 and 1988 be 
rectified accordingly.  
 
The impact of the decision  
 
The impact of the House of Lords decision was dramatic at the time and is still keenly felt 
today. The immediate effect was to trigger over 200 claims concerning the losses faced by 
bank counterparties which had entered into now void swaps with local authorities across the 
UK.
95
 The legal position on money paid out under a void contract was far from clear at the 
time of Hazell. As these claims worked their way through the courts, they did much to revive 
and to develop the law on unjust enrichment (which commentators in 1992 described as an 
‘area of English law many had thought was lost forever in the annals of legal history’)
96
 and 
to catalyse the accompanying academic debate.
97
  
Ultimately, these claims were framed as common law claims for money had and 
received, in circumstances where there had been a total failure of consideration.
98
 As a 
contemporary report on the House of Lords decision in Westdeutsche Landesbank 
Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council
99
 put it, ‘[i]n another case dealing with 
void transactions by local authorities, the House of Lords has taken the opportunity to clarify 
the restitutionary remedies available’.
100
 These did not, the House of Lords held in this 
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majority decision, include compound interest, because the banks had a common law 
restitutionary claim. In 2010 Aikens LJ observed of Hazell that ‘[t]he resulting litigation also 
led to great developments in the English law of restitution, particularly at the hands of Lord 
Goff of Chieveley.’
101
 These important developments represent the direct, substantive legacy 
of the Hammersmith litigation. However, less direct effects of Hazell, on the confidence and 
reputation of the English legal system, also need to be taken into account when assessing the 
lasting impact of the case.  
The contemporary criticism of the House of Lords decision was fierce. Three lines of 
criticism set out in a 1991 article by Martin Loughlin remain persuasive.
102 
The first is that 
Lord Templeman’s account of the motivation for local authorities to enter into swaps and of 
the details of the transactions they may be entering into, was, with respect, an over-simplified 
one. For instance, a worked example in the judgment has the bank paying its local authority 
counterparty a fixed rate equivalent to the interest paid by the local authority on a loan rather 
than the fixed swap rate
103
 and, as Loughlin points out, this affects later analysis in the 
judgment.
104
 Secondly, there is a strong argument that the House of Lords’ ‘strict 
constructionist line’
105
 was influenced by the fact that the technical questions in the case 
arose out of the outlier events at Hammersmith. As Loughlin put it, the House of Lords 
judgment was ultimately ‘skewed by the circumstances of one exceptional authority’s 
relationship to that market.’
106
 Indeed, of the reported 77 local authorities which had entered 
into swap transactions, only 18 (other than the council) entered into more than five, and this 
group entered into only 400 or so transactions in total between 1987 and 1989. Furthermore, 
the management and supervision problems at Hammersmith were exceptional, as 
subsequently investigated by the independent Veeder inquiry, which published a final report 
running to 23 chapters.
107
 This extreme set of facts looms over key parts of the House of 
Lords analysis. It is notable, for example, that a detailed discussion of the ‘immense’ scale of 
Hammersmith’s swaps dealings is embedded at the heart of the section of Lord Templeman’s 
analysis of the technical details of the swaps market and of various hypotheticals exploring 
why local authorities may wish to undertake these transactions.
108
  
Thirdly, the House of Lords decision relied upon local authorities’ ability to borrow in 
a flexible way from the Public Works Loan Board (PWLB) in order to conclude that 
Schedule 13 provided a complete code for local authorities’ borrowing powers. As Lord 
Templeman explained, a local authority may borrow at a variable rate from the PWLB when 
interest rates are high, and once they fall, convert to a fixed rate if it wished to lock in the 
lower rate.
109
 However, as the Court of Appeal identified, there were financial and practical 
disadvantages with this approach which did not apply to swaps, which could be taken up 
relatively cheaply, speedily and easily.
110
 Loughlin details some of these disadvantages, 
which include the fact that local authorities could only repay the PWLB loans on certain 
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dates, that they only had a certain quota of loans each year at a preferential rate from the 
PWLB, and the PWLB would not pay local authorities anything for cashing in loans at fixed 
rates below prevailing interest rates, in circumstances when interest rates were predicted to 
fall.
111
 Against this background, the Court of Appeal’s acceptance of swaps as a valid tool of 
interest rate risk managements seems the more realistic approach.   
On this basis, Hazell may be seen as exemplifying both problems with ultra vires 
outlined in part 2 above, namely, the unpredictability of outcomes, particularly where novel 
products are involved, and the serious, unexpected impact upon bona fides third parties. This 
is part of the reason why the House of Lords decision is still so often cited as the epitome of 
legal risk. The other part of the explanation is that the market’s response to Hazell has had as 
much of a legacy as the substance of decision itself.  
The market reaction to the House of Lords decision was furious and has been 
unmatched since. This is not surprising. Notwithstanding its rather procedural origins, the 
case became a clash of world views, which the banks lost on all counts. A nascent financial 
sector, which was hitherto regarded as a perfectly legitimate one, had been, in the House of 
Lords’ own words, tainted with the ‘stigma of unlawfulness’.
112
 One practitioner noted that 
the decision had been met with ‘incredulity on the part of many in the banking world.’
113
 
Others proclaimed that the case ‘turned the world … on its head’.
114
 To this day, the case is 
still notorious.
115
 In 2005, Professor Sir Roy Goode, writing in praise of the ‘perceived 
predictability of English law and, more particularly, of decision-making by English judges’, 
saw fit to warn that 
 
 … every now and then uncertainty is created by new instruments or by unexpected 
judicial decisions., of which the most regrettable was that of the House of Lords in 
Hazell v Hammersmith & Fulham London Borough Council, overturning an 




The contemporary criticisms of the House of Lords as uncommercial and out of touch with 
the markets made such a lasting impact because they erupted at a pivotal time for the City of 
London, coming in the immediate aftermath of the ‘Big Bang’ reforms of 1986. These 
reforms formed part of what historian David Kynsaton calls ‘the financial services revolution 
of the 1980s’
117
 during which the City was carving out its place in nascent global financial 
markets.
118
 In the context of these political and industry efforts to bolster the City’s 
international competitiveness, the damage to the international standing of English law and 
English courts was a matter of great commercial sensitivity. One market review of the ‘cases 
of 1991’described the House of Lords decision in this way: 
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 The effect was devastating. In one fell swoop English law, upheld for so long as a 
model, was exposed. And the English courts yet again appeared ill-equipped to deal 




European bank counterparties who had entered local authority swaps in good faith were 
particularly angered by the decision. One account in the Economist described French bankers 
storming out of a meeting complaining that ‘Britain’s legal standards had sunk to the level of 
Venezuela’s’.
120
 Some criticism went so far as to portray the case as an existential threat to 
the City of London. The head of legal services at Midland Montagu was quoted as remarking 
that the Hazell decision ‘gave the French institutions an opportunity to shout out loud about 
the preference for using Paris over London’.
121
  
Unsurprisingly, there were some immediate responses from regulators. In April 1991, 
The Bank of England set up of the Legal Risk Review Committee which produced a final 
report in October 1992. This report acknowledged that ‘the swaps saga has damaged the 
reputation of English law’ and concluded ‘[o]ne way or another, it is important to ensure that 
it does not happen again.’
122
 On the Committee’s recommendation, the Financial Law Panel 
(‘FLP’, now the Financial Markets Law Committee) was set up to monitor sources of legal 
risk in the financial markets.
123
 The FLP included representatives from the City and from the 
legal sector. Mrs Justice Arden was a member when she wrote that the FLP was a ‘market-
driven form of solution’
124
 to the risks revealed by Hazell, describing it as a method of 
bringing about commercial law reform.  
Mrs Justice Arden was not the only member of the judiciary expressly to recognise 
the furore caused by Hazell. In Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale, Lord Goff stated that 
 
I wish to record that [the House of Lords decision in Hazell] caused grave concern 
among financial institutions, and especially foreign banks, which had entered into 
such transactions with local authorities in good faith, with no idea that a rule as 





These various examples evidence a responsive relationship between the broader English legal 
system and the markets in the immediate aftermath of Hazell. One of the features of English 
law, cited in 2017 literature promoting the jurisdiction globally, was that it ‘evolves to adapt 
to developing business practices and behaviour’.
126
 The aftermath of Hazell is important for 
the substantive legal changes which flowed from the decision, but also as a moment in 
history where business left the legal establishment in little doubt that ‘developments’ were 
needed. The subsequent direction of English financial law, including decisions handed down 
as part of the second wave of local authority ultra vires cases, must be seen in this light.  
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The second wave of ultra vires cases 
 
Around the world in 30 years 
 
Since Hazell, the issue of the capacity of local authorities to enter into derivatives 
transactions has arisen in the English courts on a regular basis. This may be thought of as a 
‘second wave’ of local authority ultra vires cases. For example: 
 
 JP Morgan v BVG involved a ‘German public law institution… responsible for the 
provision and operation of the transport system of Berlin.’
127
 In early 2007, BVG 
entered into a complex credit swap known as an ‘independent collateral enhancement 
transaction’. BVG later argued that it understood it was reducing its own risk on 
cross-border leasing transactions it had entered into. In fact, one of the effects of the 
deal was that BVG agreed to provide JP Morgan with ten years of credit risk 
protection in respect of 150 companies, worth $220 million, for which JP Morgan 
paid BVG a fee of $7 million up front. The global financial crisis meant that various 




 The background to Haugesund Kommune v Depfa ACS Bank, decided by the Court of 
Appeal in 2010, was that Norwegian local authorities entered into swaps in the early 
2000s with a view to investing in a Credit Linked Note (‘CLN’), intending to make a 
profit which would be used to improve local services or cut taxes. Instead, these CLN 
investments went ‘disastrously wrong and the episode has been regarded as something 
of a scandal in Norway.’
129
 Combined losses were around £26.7million.
130
 The 
English litigation that resulted involved two Norwegian local authorities (Haugesund 
and Narvik), a Norwegian law firm and an Irish bank that was the subsidiary of a 
German parent.  
 
 A significant derivatives case from 2012 concerned the Ceylon Petroleum Company, 
a statutory corporation set up under Ceylon Petroleum Corporation Act 1961 for the 
purpose of supplying crude oil and petroleum products to Sri Lanka. Between  
February 2007 and mid-2008, as oil prices were rising in an unprecedented way, CPC 
entered into about 30 derivatives transactions on the ISDA Master Agreement terms 
with three banks operating in Sri Lanka, in an ‘attempt to protect itself from the rise in 
oil price’.
131
 In fact, the oil price collapsed dramatically from late July 2008 and these 
derivatives proved extremely unfavourable for CPC. Litigation over two derivatives 
with Standard Chartered Bank proceeded to the Court of Appeal. The sum being 
claimed by the bank in this case was US$166 million. Parallel proceedings, involving 
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 The ongoing saga of the Italian derivatives litigation involves international banks and 
numerous local authorities, including the Comune di Prato and the Italian Regional 
Authority for Piedmont. From 2006, Piedmont entered into derivatives on the ISDA 
Master Agreement terms as a strategy to manage interest rate risk on bonds that it had 
issued and to address other risks linked to its funding operations.
133
 Prato signed an 
ISDA Master Agreement in November 2002 with Dexia, and subsequently entered 
into a series of interest rates swaps as a method of restructuring its worrying levels of 




As Aikens LJ observed in Haugesund, ‘[i]t will be immediately obvious that none of the 
parties involved in this debacle has anything to do with England and Wales’.
135
 These 
international cases are pulled into the English courts by a variety of factors, the most 
significant amongst which is the default drafting in the ISDA Master Agreement, which has 
come to dominate the global derivatives markets since the Hazell era.  
 
Globalisation meets standardisation 
 
Between Hazell and the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2007, the OTC derivatives 
market changed beyond recognition. Innovative products found new ways to exploit the 
forward-looking quality of derivatives, (Gillian Tett memorably called them ‘a dance with 
time’),
136
 tapping into their enormous potential for structuring and complexity. Credit 
derivatives, for example, emerged very rapidly over the 1990s and ultimately came to play a 
part in the build-up to the global financial crisis, due to the opacity of these markets, and the 
way in which they exacerbated and concentrated risk. In the second half of 2007 alone, the 
notional amounts of outstanding CDS contracts increased by 36% to $58 trillion.
137
 
Meanwhile, more established products such as interest rate swaps grew into vast markets and 
are now routinely deployed by diverse end-users including companies, governments, 
supranationals, pension funds and  insurance companies around the world.
138
 Prompted by 
the central banks of the G-10 countries, the BIS started to collect official data on the global 
OTC derivatives market in 1998. At the end of June that year, the notional amount of 
outstanding contracts stood at $70 trillion.
139
 By December 2007, notional amounts 
outstanding had soared to $596 trillion.
140
  
It is safe to say that Hazell did not, for all the dire warnings from the banks, constrain 
the City of London’s participation in this boom. In 2006, the fact that London was attracting 
certain types of financial services business at a faster rate than New York prompted Mayor 
Bloomberg and Senator Schumer to investigate. In their report, they noted business leaders’ 
fears that New York risked being ‘marginalized’ as a centre for the global derivatives 
business. Tellingly, they warned that ‘[t]he more amenable and collaborative regulatory 
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environment in London in particular makes businesses more comfortable about creating new 
derivative products and structures there than in the US.’
141
  
A much-studied factor behind this dramatic evolution was the success of the 
standardised set of terms published by ISDA.
142
 ISDA was founded in the mid-1980s, when 
eleven financial institutions began to co-operate on early swap documentation. Its subsequent 
history, ambitions and exponential membership growth is inextricably linked with the 
evolution of the OTC market.
143
 Today, ISDA has 875 members from 68 countries.
144
 Over 
the last thirty years it has become involved in significant regulatory, legislative and 
educational activities around the world, but the ‘initial goal–and one of the key 
accomplishments of ISDA–has been the development, drafting, and promulgation of standard 
form documentation for the OTC derivatives industry.’
145
  
The centerpiece of this suite of standard form documentation is the Master Agreement 
which designed to provide a single, clear and legally certain ‘framework’ contract between 
two parties, which sets out the basis on which they will subsequently enter into OTC 
derivatives with one another. The document is written and published by ISDA for its 
members’ use, and versions have been published in 1987, 1992 and 2002. The Master 
Agreement is designed to be customised by using the accompanying documents also 
published by ISDA, including definitions booklets and a Credit Support Annex, in order to 
create the specific form of contractual architecture that the parties require. Critically, these 
documents are designed to be use in cross-border settings, and in this regard, they are 
bolstered by ISDA providing members with access to ‘constantly updated’
146
 legal opinions 
from dozens of jurisdictions. 
It has been estimated that over 90% of OTC derivatives worldwide are now governed 
by the ISDA Master Agreement.
147
 Most importantly for these purposes, section 13(b) of the 
contract provides for the jurisdiction of the courts of England and Wales, or New York, 
depending on the parties’ choice of governing law as between English or New York law in 
Part 4(h) of the Schedule. The effect of choosing the English version of these two default 
options, as is currently the market norm within the EU and also elsewhere, is to pull into this 
jurisdiction dozens of disputes involving global derivatives transactions. This includes each 
of the cases described at the beginning of this part of the article.
148
  
The evolution of the derivatives market over the last thirty years also explains the 
distinct features of the second wave of derivatives cases before the English courts, which 
significantly diverge from the Hazell era. Most importantly, because derivatives disputes 
before the English courts now almost always have an international dimension, they often 
involve preliminary disputes about jurisdiction. This is reflected in the very first paragraph of 
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the Court of Appeal decision in JP Morgan v Berliner Verkehrsbetriebe (BVG) Anstalt des 
Öffentlichen Rechts, which states that 
 
 Credit default swap arrangements are giving rise to litigation again. As is so often the 




The international dimension therefore complicates the issues involved in modern ultra vires 
cases arising in the derivatives market. In practice, it helps to generate new legal issues 
around jurisdiction and applicable law, while at the same time complicating traditional ones, 
relating to the definition of capacity and to the nature of any resulting claims.   
 
 




In the second wave of local authority ultra vires cases, the interaction between ultra vires and 
conflicts of law has generated novel problems for the English courts. One such issue 
concerned the definition of capacity for the purpose of the relevant conflicts of law rule.  
Determining the law which applies to a dispute about the binding nature of the 
decisions of a local authority falls outside the Rome Convention
150
 and is therefore governed 
by the English common law. In Haugesund, all parties agreed that the relevant rule was 
Dicey, Morris & Collins, rule 162, which states that: 
  
 (1) The capacity of a corporation to enter into any legal transaction is governed both 
by the constitution of the corporation and by the law of the country which governs the 
transaction in question; 
 (2) All matters concerning the constitution of a corporation are governed by the law 




On this basis, the question of whether Norwegian kommunes had capacity to enter the 
disputed swap contracts was governed by Norwegian law, pursuant to which the kommunes 
were constituted. However, the meaning of ‘capacity’ for this purpose was a novel issue 
when it arose for determination in Haugesund, which was described by Etherton LJ as 
coming down to ‘a matter of policy’.
152
 Matters were further complicated in this case by the 
fact that there was little guidance in Norwegian law on the underlying issues.
153
  
With the assistance of expert witnesses, Tomlinson J found that Norwegian law 
approached these matters very differently to English law. Unlike an English local authorities, 
Norwegian kommunes have several different sources of power, sharing some of the powers 
of natural persons as well as having powers granted to them by legislation.
154
 Put simply, 
Norwegian law regarded kommunes as autonomous entities which started with a type of 
general competence which was then limited by subsequent legislation. Moreover, the judge 
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found that Norwegian law did not in fact address the extent of the capacity of local 
authorities, nor did it focus on the validity or invalidity of the transactions but was primarily 
interested in the binding nature of the transactions for third parties.
155
 Importantly, the act of 
entering a contract was found to be reviewable rather than automatically invalid if done in 
transgression of a kommune’s powers under the relevant statute.
156
 For these reasons, it was 
‘not easy to transpose Norwegian legal theory into English terminology and in particular not 
into the language of capacity.’
157
  
Nonetheless, Tomlinson J found that under the relevant statutory regime, the 
Norwegian kommunes lacked substantive powers under Norwegian law to enter the 
contracts, and that this equated to a lack of ‘capacity’ under English law. It was common 
ground that the consequences of a lack of capacity were then a matter to be decided under the 
law of the transaction, ie, English law. As a result, the contracts were held to be void. This 
was even though under Norwegian private law would have treated them as valid and 
enforceable.  
On appeal, counsel for the bank argued that ‘capacity’ for the purpose of the Dicey 
rule should be read narrowly so that it referred to ‘capacity’ strictly defined under English 
law, as linked to nullity, but not abuse of powers. The distinction was demonstrated by 
reference to Rolled Steel Products
158
 which held that a contract entered into beyond the 
capacity of the company is wholly void, whether or not the third party had notice but where 
the contract is within the capacity of the company but in excess or abuse of powers, the 
position of the third party will depend on whether or not he had notice that the transaction 
was compromised. Under this approach, the bank argued, the kommunes had capacity as 
understood in the narrow, English sense even though their powers were limited by the 
Norwegian statute. For that reason, the bank submitted, the contracts should be regarded as 
valid.  
The Court of Appeal split in this point, with the majority deciding that there should be 
an expressly ‘internationalist’ reading of the word ‘capacity’ and of the word ‘constitution’ 
for the purposes of Dicey’s rule. As a result, ‘capacity’ in this context should take into 
account broad matters relating capacity, powers and validity under local law.
159
 The majority 
held that it was relevant that the rule was inevitably intended to apply to non-English 
corporations, and therefore ‘assumes that the legal concept of “capacity” has a commonly 
understood content and significance so far as concerns non-English corporations.’
160
 The 
majority also held that it would be risking ‘legal parochialism’ to assume that the term in 
Dicey’s rule, though a rule of English common law, should be read narrowly in line with 
English common law concepts.
161
 For the same reason the word ‘constitution’ was also given 
an ‘broad, internationalist’ meaning by the majority, and held not simply to extend to the 
equivalent of a English royal charter or memorandum and articles of association of a 
company.
162
 The broader definition included all potential sources of power including the 
relevant statutes and other ‘rules of law’ of the country of incorporation.
163
.  
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Etherton LJ disagreed with this part of the majority’s decision finding it a ‘wholly 
artificial’ approach which led to a ‘bizarre result’.
164
  In his view, ‘capacity’ for the purpose 
of Dicey’s rule should be given the narrow meaning it had under English law.
165
 
Accordingly, there would not be a lack of capacity if a decision merely exceeded an entity’s 
powers, and where a decision was not automatically void.  
In subsequent cases, litigants have indicated their intention to challenge this part of 
Haugesund.
166
 It has, however, been pointed out that the majority’s approach is persuasive 
because the court should characterise the issue as argued before the court, rather than the 
foreign rule of law, and because Dicey’s rule was intended to be pragmatic rather than 
restricted to foreign law which corresponded exactly with the English understanding of 
‘capacity’.
167
 Looking more broadly, the majority’s approach is also persuasive in the sense 
that it is consistent with the expressly internationalist and pragmatic approach to novel policy 




Once questions of jurisdiction and applicable law have been settled, it is for the court to 
evaluate if the particular contract (or contracts) are within the capacity of the local authority 
as it is defined by local law. In Haugesund, the starting point was whether the swaps were 
loans under the relevant Norwegian statute. Usually, this question turns on the purpose to 
which derivatives were put, but this important stage in the court’s analysis has been 
complicated by the nature of modern derivatives products and confusion around the terms 
‘hedging’ and ‘speculation’.   
Categorising derivatives by their purpose is a process which starts from scratch in 
each case, as it has been held to be irrelevant how the transactions would be regarded in other 
contexts, including under accounting principles
168
 or under definitions in financial services 
regulation.
169
 It has been said that the court should undertake this as an objective exercise, so 
that it does not matter what purpose the parties say that the deal was for.
170
 However, as the 
Court of Appeal in Standard Chartered pointed out, in the absence of a consistent definition 
of hedging or speculation, it is difficult to apply these terms ‘solely objectively’.
171
  
In Standard Chartered, the Court of Appeal challenged the central idea that products 
may be neatly categorized at all, and stated that ‘the question of hedging and speculation is, 
at any rate, in the context of an issue of capacity, a false question’.
172
 Given the numerous 
problems around this exercise when it is conducted in the context of highly complex 
transactions, this statement seems more than justified. As the court pointed out in Vestia, in 
the right circumstances, any derivative could potentially be a hedging product.
173
 This may 
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depend on external factors,
174
 any broader hedging strategy,
175
 or on taking into account how 
products work in combination with each other.
176
  
Overall, the tendency in some cases and commentary to use ‘hedging’ as a shorthand 
for ‘valid under the applicable rules providing for capacity’ is not helpful for four main 
reasons: it risks over-simplifying the provisions of the applicable law governing the local 
authority’s capacity; it attributes too much weight to labels which are themselves divisive 
terms, thereby opening up new questions for experts and for the court; the terms are difficult 
to apply to the complex derivatives which are the most likely to give rise to these disputes in 
the first place; and most importantly, this exercise distracts from the proper task in hand, 
which is evaluating whether the contracts are within the capacity of the user or not.  
In this context, it should be regarded as a positive development that a recent first 
instance decision involving Portuguese transport companies followed a ‘capacity-led’ 
approach, rather than attempting to define the purpose of particular products.
177
 The transport 
companies had argued that they did not have the capacity to enter into speculative 
derivatives, but the court declined to analyse the matter in this way. Notably, this part of the 
judge’s decision was not appealed,
178
 unlike the equivalent part of the first instance decision 
in Standard Chartered. 
For these reasons, litigants in ultra vires cases should avoid characterising the 
applicable legal framework in terms of hedging and speculation, and where possible, the 
courts should continue to decline the invitation to evaluate the limits of a party’s capacity in 
this unhelpful way. Moreover, regulators should take these cases as a lesson to avoid 
embedding the terms ‘hedging’ and ‘speculating’ in financial markets legislation without 






It is accepted across these cases that the consequences of any lack of capacity (broadly and 
‘internationally’ defined, according to Haugesund) are ‘to be determined by the putative 
applicable law of the contract, that is English private law.’
180
 In Haugesund, this analysis was 
accepted by both parties, and held to be implicit both in the Dicey rule and logically correct, 
as otherwise there would be ‘no scope for involvement of the putative applicable law of the 
contract.’
181
 This, however, opens the door for the traditional, unmitigated version of the 
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English doctrine of ultra vires. The harsh consequences of this doctrine and sizeable sums at 
stake have led banks to come up with various arguments trying to squeeze their 
counterparties within some of the recent legislative measures designed to reform the law in 
this area.  
For example, a creative, though ultimately unsuccessful, argument in Vestia 
referenced First Council Directive on company law of March 1968.
182
 One of the objectives 
of this Directive was  
 
  to ensure certainty in the law as regards relations between the company and third 
parties, and also between members, to limit the cases in which nullity can arise and 




The argument put forward in this case was that the relevant sections of the Companies Act 
2006 should be interpreted to apply to equivalent EU entities and protect them from the 
English rule on ultra vires.
184
 The problem with this argument in the context of Vestia was 
that the Directive itself did not cover the ‘stichting’ form of association, but only BV and NV 
(companies). There was no basis, therefore, to extend the coverage of the English Companies 
Act 2006 to a Dutch stichting. The same argument was raised in the later case of Banco 
Santander Totta SA v Companhia De Carris De Ferro De Lisboa SA, but as these swaps had 
already been held to be within the capacity of the public sector Portuguese companies, it did 
not have to be decided on that occasion.
185
  
Thus, at present, where court concludes that an entity lacks ‘capacity’, it means that 
swaps will be held to be void under English law, even if they would be valid under domestic 
law (the case in Haugesund, but not in Vestia) and even if the same act if done by an English 
entity would also be valid. As a practical matter, this leaves bank counterparties to pursue a 
variety of remedial options. To date, as well as claims in restitution, these have included 
novel arguments that the representations in the over-arching ISDA Master Agreement remain 
valid and provide a basis for damages
186
 and attempts to recover losses from their legal 
advisors.
187
   
At this final stage, the foreign dimension to the second wave of local authority ultra 
vires cases once again generates unprecedented questions. Several arose in Haugesund, 
including the councils’ argument that a claim for restitution would be contrary to Norwegian 
public policy.
188
 The question of whether an English court considering an English law claim 
for restitution should take into account foreign public policy was described by the Court of 
Appeal as unprecedented. As a result, the Court sought to reason ‘from first principle’, 
ultimately holding that, subject to English public policy,
189
  it would be ‘logical and 
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consistent’ to consider foreign statute at this point, given that it had taken account of the same 
statute when deciding the issue of capacity in the first place.
190
 However, the Court of Appeal 
unanimously upheld the judge’s decision that nothing under this statute would bar recovery 
of money paid under a contract which was invalid.
191
 The councils therefore failed in this 






At the beginning of the majority decision in Haugesund, Aikens LJ remarked that ‘[h]istory 
repeats itself, at least with variations.’
192
 This article has investigated the variations over 
thirty years of local authority ultra vires cases. It has found that, like the markets themselves, 
these cases have become more complex and more international since the Hazell era. This 
explains why, even though English law has significantly circumscribed the ultra vires 
doctrine, a mutation of the original problem continues to generate novel and difficult legal 
questions before the English courts.  
The legal rules which have emerged over the course of the second wave of ultra vires 
cases have been shown to have an internationalist, market-minded and pragmatic character. 
This contrasts sharply with the approach of the House of Lords in Hazell which found early 
swaps tainted with the ‘stigma of unlawfulness’. This evolution has been linked to two 
factors. First, it has been linked to the fierce criticism that Hazell provoked at a pivotal 
moment in history. From this perspective, the most important legacy of Hazell was not any 
damage to the City of London or to the foundations of the derivatives market (despite the 
colourful claims in aftermath of the decision) but rather the timing and the extent of the 
market response which the House of Lords decision triggered. For this reason, Hazell is an 
important part of understanding where we are today. Secondly, this evolution has been 
explained in terms of structural changes in the prevailing markets, which have seen the 
English courts become an embedded part of the contractual architecture dominating the OTC 
derivatives markets.  
Thirty years on from Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council’s fateful 
scaling-up of its derivatives activities, the law around the capacity of local authorities has 
grown more intensely complex. Taking a long view shows that this area of law now contains 
a difficult internal contradiction. On the one hand, in the cases described in the second half of 
this article we may still observe the traditional and largely discredited English doctrine of 
ultra vires, with all the associated risks of unpredictable decisions for parties who deal in 
good faith. On the other hand, these recent cases also offer clear proof of the responsiveness, 
pragmatism and international outlook of the English courts, armed as they are with the 
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